This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation-proof contracts and strategies for general extensive form games with incomplete information and apply our results to two-stage games. If contracts are observable, then the second mover obtains her best possible payoff given that she plays a renegotiation-proof strategy and the first mover best responds. If contracts are unobservable, then a "folk theorem" type result holds: Any outcome in which the second mover best responds to the first mover's action on the equilibrium path and the first mover receives at least his "individually rational payoff", can be supported. We also apply our results to games with monotone externalities and to a model of credibility of monetary policy and show that in both cases renegotiation-proofness imposes a very simple restriction.
Introduction
Could an incumbent firm deter entry by contracting with third parties, such as a bank or a labor union? Could a central bank (or a government in a union) credibly commit to monetary policy (or fiscal policy) through a contract with the government (or supranational body)? More generally can contracts with third parties change the outcome of a game to the advantage of the contracting player?
When contracts are non-renegotiable, the answer to this question is in general yes. 1 In fact, there are several "folk theorem" type results for different classes of games with observable and non-renegotiable third-party contracts. 2 The effects of unobservable and non-renegotiable third-party contracts are also well-understood: Nash equilibrium outcomes of a game with and without third-party contracts are identical (Katz (1991) ). In fact, all (and only) Nash equilibrium outcomes of the original game can be supported as a sequential equilibrium outcome of the game with unobservable and nonrenegotiable contracts (Koçkesen and Ok (2004) and Koçkesen (2007) ). 3 In this paper we seek an answer to this question for renegotiable contracts. When a player in a game lacks the reputation to commit to a course of action that is not sequentially rational, writing a contract with a third-party is a natural way to achieve such a commitment. However, if the contracting parties also lack the reputation to commit not to renegotiate the contract, one has to consider renegotiable contracts. We analyze if and how renegotiable third-party contracts change the equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information. In the main body of the paper we consider only two-player two-stage games where the second mover (player 2) has some payoff relevant private information. In what we call the original game, Nature moves first and determines the state of the world θ. After that, player 1 chooses an action a 1 without observing θ. Player 2 observes both θ and a 1 , chooses a 2 , and the game ends. Payoff function of player i = 1, 2 is u i (a 1 , a 2 , θ). Player 1's strategy is simply a choice of action a 1 whereas player 2's strategy is a function b 2 (a 1 , θ).
In the game with contracts we let player 2 sign a contract with a neutral third-party before the original game starts. A contract specifies transfers between player 2 and the third-party as a function of the contractible outcomes, which we assume to be the action choices of the two players, (a 1 , a 2 ).
The underlying and crucial assumption is that the private information of player 2 is not observable by any other player, including the third-party, and thus non-contractible. Given a contract f , the third-party's payoff is f (a 1 , a 2 ) whereas player 2's is u 2 (a 1 , a 2 , θ) − f (a 1 , a 2 ).
Our main objective is to understand the outcomes of the original game that can be supported in some equilibrium of the game with contracts. The first question that we need to answer is the type of strategies b 2 (a 1 , θ) that can be supported by a contract, i.e., incentive compatible strategies. Since contracts cannot depend on θ, incentive compatibility imposes some restrictions on b 2 . In order to get a handle on these restrictions, we assume that player 2's payoff function exhibits increasing differences in (θ, a 2 ). It then follows that strategy b 2 is incentive compatible if and only if it is increasing in θ (This is Proposition 2 on page 9). 1 See, among many others, Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987) , Koçkesen et.al. (2000) , Brander and The second important step is to characterize the restrictions imposed by renegotiation. We model renegotiation as a game form: After player 1 moves, player 2 can make a renegotiation offer to the third-party, who knows a 1 , but not θ, and can either accept the offer or reject it. We define renegotiation-proof equilibrium as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the equilibrium contract is not renegotiated after any (θ, a 1 ) and characterize the renegotiation-proof contracts and strategies (This is Theorem 1 on page 11). We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be renegotiation-proof (Propositions 3 and 4). 4 These results generalize quite readily to arbitrary extensive form games with incomplete information where players are free to use mixed strategies, to environments in which the third-party is not neutral, and to stronger notions of renegotiationproofness (See Section 4).
In Section 5 we present the implications of the above results in terms of the outcomes of the original game. We allow contracts to be observable or unobservable (by player 1) and renegotiable or non-renegotiable. We show that if contracts are observable, then player 2 can commit credibly to his Stackelberg payoff, i.e., the best payoff that he can achieve given that player 1 plays a best response.
If the contracts are non-renegotiable, then the only restriction on the Stackelberg payoff is that player 2 uses an increasing strategy (Proposition 6). If contracts are renegotiable, then they also have to be renegotiation-proof (Proposition 8). We also show that these are the only outcomes that can be supported (Propositions 7 and 9). In other words, as long as one respects the restrictions imposed by incentive compatibility and renegotiation-proofness, contracts indeed serve as credible commitment devices.
We next consider unobservable contracts. We show that if contracts are non-renegotiable, then
any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the original game in which player 2's strategy is increasing can be supported (Proposition 10). In fact, we prove a folk theorem type result: any outcome (a contracts (renegotiable or not) we can also commit to a promise. 5 We illustrate this point with two applications: entry-deterrence and credibility of monetary policy. We show that it is possible to deter entry with renegotiation-proof contracts even when they are unobservable, whereas, in the monetary policy game, commitment to a low inflation rate is possible only with observable contracts.
Entry-deterrence game is an example of a more general class of games, which we call games with monotone externalities and analyze in Section 6.1. In games with monotone externalities, player 1's payoff is increasing or decreasing in Player 2's action for a given action a 1 . Suppose, for concreteness, that player 1's payoff is increasing in a 2 . If contracts are non-renegotiable, then player 2 can obtain a favorable outcome by punishing player 1 by playing the smallest a 2 whenever he plays an unfavorable action. Since a constant strategy is increasing, incentive compatibility does not bring any further restrictions on the outcomes that can be supported with non-renegotiable contracts. On the other hand, renegotiation-proofness imposes a very specific type of constraint on the kind of punishment player 2 can inflict upon player 1: The highest type of player 2 must play a best response while the other types could keep playing the smallest action (Corollary 3). 6 In other words, the additional restriction renegotiation-proofness brings about depends on the probability of the highest type: The lower this probability, the less severe is the effect of renegotiation.
The class of games with monotone externalities is large and contains many economic models.
The canonical example, of course, is the Stackelberg competition. We show that in this game, the follower firm indeed benefits from renegotiation-proof third-party contracts. This game can also be construed as an entry deterrence game, in which case we show that entry can always be deterred with non-renegotiable contracts but only under certain conditions with renegotiation-proof contracts, i.e., renegotiation has real bite in these games.
In Section 6.2, we apply our results to the well-known problem of credibility of monetary policy:
Once the public forms expectations of inflation, the government has an incentive to create surprise inflation in order to decrease unemployment. This implies that inflation is inefficiently high in the rational expectations equilibrium (Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Barro and Gordon (1983) ). Contracts with central banks have been suggested as a possible solution to this problem (Walsh (1995) , Persson and Tabellini (1993) ). In fact, in many countries central banks have mandates in the form of inflationary targets, which may be interpreted as contracts. With observable and non-renegotiable contracts we obtain a result that is well-known in the literature: The equilibrium outcome of the game with contracts has no inflationary bias and induces the socially optimal policy (Proposition 14) . If the contracts are observable and renegotiable, the inflationary bias cannot be eliminated completely but is lower than the one resulting from discretionary monetary policy (Proposition 15). In other words, the possibility to renegotiate the contract reduces the commitment role played by contracts but does not eliminate it. Also in this application, renegotiation-proofness imposes a very specific type of constraint on the equilibrium strategies of the contracting party (monetary authority): The inflation rate chosen by the monetary authority in the "worst" state of the world (e.g., a financial crisis) is the same as the inflation rate chosen without contracts (i.e., higher), while the inflation rate chosen in all other states is the same as the inflation rate chosen in the game with non-renegotiable contracts. There- 5 In other words, with unobservable contracts we can support non-sequentially rational strategies only off the equilibrium path while with observable contracts, we can support non-sequentially rational strategies also on the equilibrium path (See Koçkesen and Ok (2004) and Koçkesen (2007) ). 6 This is true when player 1's payoff is increasing in player 2's action. If his payoff is decreasing, then the harshest punishment player 2's can impose is to play the highest action for all types other than the lowest, who must play a best response.
fore, in this case too, the higher the probability of the worst state, the more severe is the effect of renegotiation.
These two applications have also an interesting implication about optimal credible commitments.
A commitment (or a contract) that is optimal to carry out in every state of the world will never be renegotiated and therefore is very credible. However, such contracts are rarely optimal ex ante because in many situations it is beneficial to commit to a different strategy. Monetary policy is a case in point.
Another way to achieve high credibility is to make renegotiation very difficult. For example, in many countries central banks have a mandate to hit a particular inflation target, which cannot be altered.
Such contracts, however, may turn out to be suboptimal ex post, for example when a small probability event such as a financial crisis occurs. This is exactly what happened in many countries including England, where the government has an incentive to create some inflation in order to escape the liquidity trap but cannot do so because of the aforementioned mandate of the central bank. 7 Our results suggest that in order to achieve optimal commitments that are also credible, one needs to allow flexibility in some states of the world. For example, optimal monetary rule that is also credible would need to allow for a higher inflation rate in case of a serious crisis.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE
The general message of this paper is that while renegotiation does limit the commitment value of third-party contracts (in general, renegotiation has bite), it does not completely destroy it. This message complements and clarifies the results in the existing literature. Dewatripont (1988) analyzes an entry-deterrence game in which the incumbent signs a contract with a labor union before the game begins. A potential entrant observes the contract and then decides whether to enter or not. Renegotiation takes place after the entry decision is made, during which the union offers a new contract to the incumbent. The crucial assumption is that the incumbent has some payoff relevant private information during the renegotiation process. Dewatripont (1988) shows that commitment effects exist in such a model and may deter entry when contracts are publicly observable. One contribution of our paper is to show that commitment effects exist in arbitrary two-stage games: For example oligopoly models with price competition and games in which credible commitment to monetary and fiscal policy is valuable. Furthermore, we show that commitment effects exist even if the contracts are unobservable and hence they exist also if we allow the contracts to be renegotiated immediately after they are signed. In fact, allowing for secret renegotiation right after the contracts are signed has no effect on the results if the game is with unobservable contracts and reduces the case of observable contracts to unobservable ones. (1988) , is that by allowing secret renegotiation, Caillaud et al. (1995) enhanced the realism of the model and clarified the role of strategic contracting. 9 The crucial difference between our model and Caillaud et al. is that they assume that agents play a simultaneous move game (and principals offer contracts to the agents simultaneously) whereas we focus on sequential move games. Therefore, one contribution of our paper is to show that the differences between the results of Caillaud et al. (1995) and Dewatripont (1988) do not depend on allowing secret renegotiation right after the contracts are signed, but instead depend on the fact that Dewatripont (1988) studies a sequential move game while Caillaud et al. (1995) a simultaneous move game.
In a related paper, Gerratana and Koçkesen (2012) also study the effects of renegotiation-proof third-party contracts in two-stage games. However, that paper assumes that the original game is with perfect information whereas the current one assumes it is a game with incomplete information. Some aspects of the analyses of these two models are similar and use similar tools, namely theorems of the alternative. Indeed, results on renegotiation-proof contracts and strategies in Section 3 (Theorem 1
and Propositions 3 and 4) are exact analogs of their counterparts in Gerratana and Koçkesen (2012) .
However, the games to which these are applied are completely different, and so are the effects of renegotiation. For the class of games for which Gerratana and Koçkesen (2012) obtain sharp results, renegotiation has no bite, that is, the outcomes of games with unobservable and non-renegotiable contracts are robust to the introduction of renegotiation. 10 This is not true in the current paper, where renegotiation, in general, has a bite. Furthermore, in the current paper we extend our results to (1) arbitrary extensive form games and mixed strategies; (2) to non-neutral third-parties; and (3) to the case of observable contracts.
In addressing the question of how renegotiation affects the commitment value of third-party contracts we assumed that in the renegotiation stage the contracting party and the third-party have asymmetric information. 11 This choice seems natural in settings where the original game has incomplete information. Therefore, we hope that the analysis developed in this paper could be used for other applications not considered in this paper.
The Model
Our aim is to understand the effects of renegotiation-proof third-party contracts in extensive form games. In this section, we will do this in a particularly simple environment: two-stage games with private information, which we call the original game. Dewatripont (1988) and Caillaud et al. (1995) . However, other researchers analyzed different kind of frictions in the renegotiation stage (see for example Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1993) , who find that renegotiable contract have commitment effects in a model with non-transferable utility).
form games with incomplete information as long as they satisfy an increasing differences property (see Definition 8) .
We allow one of the players to sign a contract with a third-party before the original game begins and call this new game the game with third-party contracts. The contract specifies a transfer between the player and the third-party as a function of the contractible outcomes of the original game. The crucial aspect of our model is the presence of asymmetric information between this player and the third-party during the renegotiation phase.
More precisely, we define the original game, denoted G, as follows: Nature chooses θ ∈ Θ according to probability distribution p ∈ ∆(Θ). After the move of Nature, player 1, without observing θ, chooses a 1 ∈ A 1 . Lastly, player 2 observes (θ, a 1 ) and chooses a 2 ∈ A 2 . We assume that A 1 , A 2 , and Θ are finite and let p(θ) denote the probability of Nature choosing θ. Payoff function of player i ∈ {1, 2} is given by
The game with third-party contracts is a three player extensive form game described by the following sequence of events: Player 2 offers a contract f : A → R to a third-party. The third-party accepts (denoted y) or rejects (denoted n) the contract. In case of rejection the game ends and the third-party receives a fixed payoff of δ ∈ R while player 2 receives −∞. 12 In case of acceptance, player 1 and 2 play the original game. We assume that throughout the entire game θ remains the private information of player 2.
Since offering a contract that is rejected yields player 2 a very small payoff, the contract offer will be accepted in all equilibria. Therefore, for simplicity, we omit the third-party's acceptance decision from histories and represent an outcome of the game with third-party contracts as ( f , θ, a 1 , a 2 ). The payoff functions in the game with contracts are given by
, where v 3 is the payoff function of the third-party.
Note that the payoff function of the third-party assumes that he is neutral towards the outcome of the game, i.e., he cares only about the transfer. In Section 4.2 we relax this assumption and allow the third-party also to have intrinsic preferences over the outcomes of the original game.
The game is with renegotiable contracts if the contracting parties can renegotiate the contract after player 1 plays a 1 and before player 2 chooses a 2 . We assume that player 2, who is the informed party, initiates the renegotiation process by offering a new contract, which the third-party may accept or reject. If the third-party rejects the renegotiation offer g , then player 2 chooses a 2 ∈ A 2 and the outcome is payoff equivalent to f , θ, a 1 , a 2 . If he accepts, then player 2 chooses a 2 ∈ A 2 and the outcome is payoff equivalent to g , θ, a 1 , a 2 .
We say that the game is with observable contracts if the initial contract is observed by player 1.
Otherwise, we say that the game is with unobservable contracts. In other words, there are four possible games with third-party contracts depending upon whether the contract is renegotiable or nonrenegotiable and observable or unobservable. Given an original game G, we will denote the game with non-renegotiable and observable contracts with Γ NO (G), non-renegotiable and unobservable contracts with Γ NU (G), renegotiable and observable contracts with Γ RO (G), and renegotiable and unobservable contracts with Γ RU (G).
A behavior strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is defined as a set of probability measures β i ≡ {β i (I ) :
I ∈ I i }, where I i is the set of information sets of player i and β i (I ) is defined on the set of actions available at information set I . One may write β i (h) for β i (I ) for any history h ∈ I . By a system of beliefs, we mean a set µ ≡ {µ(I ) : I ∈ I i for some i }, where µ(I ) is a probability measure on I . A pair (β, µ) is called an assessment. An assessment (β, µ) is said to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if (1) each player's strategy is optimal at every information set given her beliefs and the other players' strategies; and (2) beliefs at every information set are consistent with observed histories and strategies. 13 We will limit our analysis to pure behavior strategies, and hence a strategy profile of the origi-
14 For any behavioral strategy profile (b 1 , b 2 ) of G, define the expected payoff of player i = 1, 2 as
The difference between a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, of course, is that the former requires player 2 to best respond to every action of player 1, whereas the latter requires best response to only the equilibrium action. Therefore, every perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium but not conversely.
For any behavior strategy profile ( Our ultimate aim is to characterize renegotiation-proof equilibria, in which the equilibrium contract is not renegotiated after any history. 16 More precisely,
and Γ RU (G) is renegotiation-proof if the equilibrium contract is not renegotiated after any a 1 ∈ A 1 and θ ∈ Θ.
We say that a strategy profile (b 1 14 In Section 4.1 we relax this and allow also mixed strategies. This introduces some technical difficulties but our main results go through. 15 Note that in Γ RO (G) and Γ RU (G), player 2 may choose an action a 2 ∈ A 2 either without renegotiating the initial contract or after attempting renegotiation. 16 We follow the previous literature in our definition of renegotiation-proof equilibrium. See, for example, Maskin and Tirole (1992) and Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) .
Proof. In Section 8.
AN EXAMPLE: ENTRY DETERRENCE
In order to illustrate our main query as well as some of our results later on, we introduce a very simple entry game in this section (See Figure 1) . Player 1 is a potential entrant, who may enter (E ) or stay out (O) and player 2, who is the incumbent, may fight (F ) or accommodate (A) entry.
Figure 1: Entry Game
We assume that fighting is costly, and it is costlier for the high cost incumbent (type c h ) than for the low cost (type c l ): z −w > x − y > 0. The entrant believes that the incumbent's type is low cost with probability p ∈ (0, 1).
The unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this game is (E , A A), i.e., the entrant enters and both types of the incumbent accommodate. We assume that the monopoly profit is larger than the highest possible profit following entry, i.e., m > x. In other words, the incumbent would benefit from deterring entry, and one way of achieving this would be to sign a contract with a thirdparty that makes fighting optimal. For example, the following contract makes playing F F optimal:
Is such a contract renegotiation-proof? If not, can entry still be deterred with renegotiation-proof contracts? In what follows we will answer these questions and also characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can be supported with third-party contracts under different assumptions regarding their observability and renegotiation-proofness.
Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
In this section we will provide results that help identify the set of outcomes of any original game G that can be supported by renegotiation-proof perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game with observable (or unobservable) and renegotiable contracts.
In order to decide whether to accept a new contract offer in the renegotiation phase of the game with renegotiable contracts, the third-party forms beliefs regarding player 2's strategy under the new contract and compares his payoffs from the old and the new contracts. In equilibrium, these beliefs must be such that player 2's strategies are sequentially rational, i.e., incentive compatible, under the new contract. Let the contract space be C = R A 1 ×A 2 and define incentive compatibility as a property
We say that a strategy b 2 is incentive compatible if there is a contract f such that ( f , b 2 ) is incentive compatible. We can obtain a sharp characterization of incentive compatible strategies if we impose more structure on the original game. To this end, let θ be a linear order on Θ and 2 a linear order on A 2 , and denote their asymmetric parts by ≻ θ and ≻ 2 , respectively.
Definition 4 (Increasing Strategies
For the rest of the paper, we restrict attention to games G in which there exist a linear order on Θ and a linear order on A 2 such that u 2 has strictly increasing differences in ( θ , 2 ). Standard arguments show that under increasing differences, incentive compatibility implies that b 2 is increasing.
The following proposition states this result and shows that its converse also holds. Proof. Omitted.
The only if part follows from a standard argument in contract theory. In order to prove the if part fix an arbitrary a 1 ∈ A 1 , let the number of elements of Θ be n, and order its elements so that
. . , n, and let, with an abuse of notation, f (a 1 ) ∈ R n be the vector whose j th component is given by f (a 1 ) j . When u 2 has increasing differences, incentive compatibility of ( f , b 2 ) is equivalent to the local upward and downward constraints:
For any a 1 ∈ A 1 , we can write these inequalities in matrix form as D f (a 1 ) ≤ U 2 (a 1 , b 2 ), where D is a matrix of coefficients and U 2 (a 1 , b 2 ) a column vector with 2(n − 1) components, whose component 2 j − 1 is given by
and component 2 j is given by
Therefore, the proof will be completed if we can show that if u 2 has strictly increasing differences and b 2 increasing, then there exists
. This follows easily from
Gale's theorem for linear inequalities (Mangasarian (1994) , p. 33).
We next define our renegotiation-proofness concept, which follows from the definition of renegotiation-proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Definition 1).
is renegotiation-proof if for all a 1 ∈ A 1 and θ ∈ Θ for which there exists an incentive compatible (g , b 2 ) such that
there exists a θ ′ ∈ Θ such that
In words, if, for some (θ, a 1 ), there is a contract g and an incentive compatible continuation play b 2 such that player 2 prefers g over f (i.e., (1) holds), there must exist a belief of the third-party (over θ) under which it is optimal to reject g , which is implied by (2). 18 Finally, we define a renegotiation-proof strategy as, is not renegotiation-proof, then there is (a 1 , θ) and a contract g that would be accepted for any belief of the third-party at the renegotiation stage and increase player 2's payoff. In other words, f will be renegotiated after (a 1 , θ) and therefore the equilibrium is not renegotiation-proof. In fact, the converse of that statement also holds: If b 2 is renegotiation-proof, we can construct a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with renegotiable contracts in which the equilibrium contract is not renegotiated after any a 1 and θ. Of course, the equilibrium contract and b 2 will also have to satisfy other conditions for them to be part of an equilibrium, but these would depend on whether the contracts are observable or unobservable, an issue which we will address in Section 5.
In this section we present a result that characterizes renegotiation-proof contracts and strategies.
In order to understand this result one should first realize that condition (2) in Definition 5 is satisfied trivially if the strategy b 2 does not lead to a higher surplus for the contracting parties after (a 1 , θ).
In other words, for each a 1 and i = 1, . . . n, we need to check renegotiation-proofness of ( f , b * 2 ) only against strategies that belong to the following set:
is not renegotiation-proof if and only if there exist a 1 ∈ A 1 , i = 1, . . . n, and incentive compatible (g ,
As we have discussed after Proposition 2, when u 2 has increasing differences, incentive compatibility of (g ,
is not renegotiation-proof if and only if there exist a 1 , i , b 2 and ε ∈ R n such that
These conditions can be written as [Ax ≫ 0,C x ≥ 0 has a solution x], once the vector x and matrices A and C are appropriately defined. Motzkin's theorem of the alternative then implies that the necessary and sufficient condition for being renegotiation-proof is [
0 has a solution y 1 , y 2 ]. The fact that u 2 has increasing differences can then be used to prove the equivalence of this condition to the one stated in the following theorem.
is renegotiation-proof if and only if for any a 1 ∈ A 1 , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and
or there exists an l ∈ {i + 1, i + 2, . . . , n} such that
Proof. Omitted.
Theorem 1 characterizes the conditions for which f , b * 2 is renegotiation-proof. Our next step is to find conditions for a strategy b * 2 to be supported with renegotiation-proof contracts. The following definition facilitates the exposition.
We obtain the following necessary conditions for a strategy b
is renegotiation-proof only if for any a 1 ∈ A 1 , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and
there is a blocking type.
The above condition becomes also sufficient for renegotiation-proofness with an additional requirement about the relation of blocking types for different renegotiation opportunities.
is renegotiation-proof if for any a 1 ∈ A 1 , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and
The conditions given in Proposition (3) and (4) coincide when player 2 has only two types. Therefore, Proposition (3) is a full characterization result for such games. Although, they fall short of providing a full characterization in games with more than two types, they help us do so in environments with more structure as we demonstrate in Section 6.
EXAMPLE: ENTRY DETERRENCE
Let c h ≻ θ c l and A ≻ 2 F and observe that z − w > x − y implies that u 2 has strictly increasing differ- 
the answer is no, i.e., F F is not renegotiation-proof. Is F A renegotiation-proof? In this case B(E , c l , F A) = {A A} and B(E , c h , F A) = . Is there a blocking type for c l ? Since
the answer is yes. Therefore, the set of renegotiation-proof strategies is {F A, A A}. In other words, renegotiation-proofness in this example is satisfied whenever the high cost type best responds. Also note that for the high cost type, not best responding is costlier, i.e., z − w > x − y. Credible commitment, in this example, requires best responding when it is very costly no to do so. Finally, an example of a contract that supports
Extensions
So far we have assumed that the original game has only two stages and conducted the equilibrium analysis in pure strategies. Furthermore, we have assumed that the third-party is neutral. In this section we show that all our main results can be generalized to a much more general class of extensive form games with incomplete information and they are true in mixed strategy equilibria as well. We also discuss how our results are modified when third-parties are not neutral. Finally, we present the implications of a stronger definition of renegotiation-proofness.
General Extensive Form Games
Although we have stated our results for two stage games in which only player 2 has private information and has the right to sign a contract with a third-party, we can generalize them to arbitrary finite extensive form games with incomplete information and perfect recall. The only restriction we impose is that players' payoff functions in the original game exhibit increasing differences in a sense that we will make precise.
Define the original game G as an extensive form game with incomplete information in which player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} privately learns his type θ i ∈ Θ i at the beginning of the game. Assume that Nature chooses types independently and let |Θ i | = n i . After the types are determined players start taking actions. We denote the set of histories (excluding the moves of Nature at the beginning) by H and denote a typical history by h = (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k ), where a 0 is the initial node (or empty history) and a j denotes the j th action taken in this history. Payoff function of player i is given by u i : Z × Θ → R, where Z is the set of (finite) terminal histories and Θ is the set of all type profiles θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ).
The set of pure strategies of player i is given by S i and a mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over S i for each θ i , i.e., a mapping σ i : Θ i → ∆(S i ). A pure strategy profile is denoted by s and mixed strategy profile by σ. Denote the set of all information sets at which player i moves by I i and the set of all information sets in the game by I . At any information set I ∈ I i , player i has a set of pure strategies available for the rest of the game, denoted S i | I and defined as the restriction of S i to information sets of player i that follows (and includes) I . A belief system is a collection of probability measures m = {m(I ) : I ∈ I }, where m(I ) for I ∈ I i is defined over I × Θ −i . A pair (σ, m) is called an assessment. 19 We say that an assessment is consistent if beliefs at every information set are derived from prior beliefs, observed histories, and strategies using Bayes' Law whenever possible.
We assume that for every player i and information set I ∈ I i , S i | I is a chain. In other words, there is a binary relation i on Θ i and si on S i that is reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive, and complete. 20 We denote the asymmetric parts of i and si by ≻ i and ≻ si , respectively.
Fix a player i and an information set I ∈ I i . Given an history h ∈ I , if the type profile is θ, player i plays s i ∈ S i | I , and other players play s −i ∈ S −i | I , payoff of player i can be written as
Definition 8 (Increasing Differences). We say that an original game G has increasing differences if for
and s i si s
imply that
for all h ∈ I , s −i ∈ S −i | I , and θ −i ∈ Θ −i . It is said to have strictly increasing differences if θ i ≻ i θ ′ i and 19 The original game as well as the games with contracts that we will define shortly have perfect recall and therefore for every behavior strategy there is an outcome equivalent mixed strategy and vice versa. Therefore, we are free to work with either the behavior or mixed strategies, whichever more convenient. 20 Note that any chain is a lattice. Also, we omit the dependence of si on I to avoid notational clutter. 21 We can do that by finding the terminal history z(h, s i , s −i ) that is reached when players play according to (s i , s −i ) after
for all h ∈ I , s −i ∈ S −i | I , and θ −i ∈ Θ −i .
In other words, an original game G has increasing differences if the payoff functions have increasing differences in (s i , θ i ) ∈ S i | I × Θ i at every information set I irrespective for how the other players play and what the types of the other players are. We assume that the original game G has strictly increasing differences. Examples of games with increasing differences include repeated ultimatum bargaining and chain store games.
The induced game with non-renegotiable and renegotiable contracts are straightforward generalizations of their counterparts for two stage games. Each player i independently offers a contract f i : Z → R to a distinct third-party t i , who accepts or rejects it. In case of rejection the game ends, t i receives a fixed payoff of δ i ∈ R, and player i receives −∞. In case of acceptance Nature chooses θ and players in N play G.
We assume that only player i observes his type θ i , and that this is the only source of asymmetric information between i and the third-party t i . In other words, at any point in the game both the main player and his third-party observe the same histories. The payoff functions are given by
One of the conditions that strategies must satisfy in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with contracts, is that player i 's strategy must be sequentially rational, or incentive compatible, under the contract. Increasing differences imply that this is equivalent to strategies being increasing. Define a mixed strategy as increasing if any pure strategy in its support is increasing in the type. We have the following counterpart to Proposition 2.
Proposition 5. If the original game G has strictly increasing differences, then a mixed strategy is incentive compatible if and only if it is increasing.
The game is with renegotiable contracts if the contracting parties can renegotiate the contract at any point throughout the game. At any information set I ∈ I i player i either offers a new contract g i : Z → R to the third-party t i or chooses an action. If player i offers a new contract, the third-party either accepts or rejects it.
We retain the same definition of renegotiation-proofness. Fix a consistent assessment (σ, m). We say that a contract strategy pair ( f i , σ i ) is renegotiation-proof at (σ −i , m), if whenever there is a contract g i and an incentive compatible continuation play σ
such that player i of type θ i strictly prefers ).
In order to state the counterpart to our main result for renegotiation-proof contracts we need a few more definitions. :
be the set of all mixed strategies at information set I that is increasing and increases the payoff of player i type j over his payoff under σ i .
Theorem 1 generalizes in a quite straightforward way:
) if and only if for any I
Once the definition of a blocking type is appropriately modified (see Definition 7), Propositions 3 and 4 also generalize in a straightforward manner.
Interested Third-Party
In our model we assumed that the third-party has no interest in the outcome of the original game other than the transfer from (or to) player 2. This is not always the case with third-party contracts. For example, the government in its contractual relationship with a central bank is likely to be interested in the outcome of the game between the central bank and the public. Similarly, the European Union in its contractual relationships with Airbus is interested in the entry game played by Airbus and Boeing.
We can easily think of many other instances of games with third-party contracts in which the thirdparty itself is interested in the outcome of the game. How do our results change if this is the case? The answer turns out to be straightforward and intuitive.
Let u 3 (a 1 , a 2 , θ) be the third-party's payoff function so that under contract f his payoff would be
2 ) is renegotiation-proof if for all a 1 ∈ A 1 and θ ∈ Θ for which there exists an incentive compatible (g , b 2 ) such that 22 Note that independence of types across players implies that the beliefs of player i over h and θ −i , i.e., m(h,θ −i |I ), do not depend on θ i . For the same reason expected transfers to pure strategy s i do not depend on θ i .
In the model with neutral third-party a renegotiation opportunity arises whenever there is an increasing strategy that increases player 2's payoff u 2 (a 1 , a 2 , θ), which is the total surplus available to player 2 and the third-party in that model. When the third-party is no longer neutral, total surplus available becomes u 2 (a 1 , a 2 , θ) + u 3 (a 1 , a 2 , θ). Accordingly, a renegotiation opportunity arises whenever there is an increasing strategy that increases total surplus u 2 (a 1 , a 2 , θ) + u 3 (a 1 , a 2 , θ). Therefore, we modify the definition of B(a 1 , i , b * 2 ) as the set of strategies b 2 that are increasing and satisfy
We can now state the modified version of Theorem 1:
Note that an interested third-party introduces two changes into the result: First, a renegotiation opportunity arises only if it increases the total surplus rather than just player 2's payoff. This might in fact help a contract become renegotiation-proof, if, for example, the third-party and player 2 have completely opposite preferences. Second, compared with (4) and (5), inequalities (10) and (11) have extra terms on the left hand side, which might help or hurt a contract become renegotiation-proof depending upon the sign of those terms.
Again, once the definition of a blocking type is appropriately modified, Propositions 3 and 4 can be easily generalized to the case of non-neutral third-party.
Strong Renegotiation-Proofness
Our definition of renegotiation-proofness follows directly from the assumed game form for the renegotiation procedure, i.e., player 2, who is the the informed party, makes a new contract offer and the third-party, who is uninformed, accepts or rejects. In a renegotiation-proof equilibrium, the contract is never renegotiated, and therefore any renegotiation offer is an out-of-equilibrium event. This allows us to specify the beliefs of the third-party freely after a new contract offer. This may be found unreasonable and a more plausible alternative could be to require beliefs satisfy the conditions specified in the intuitive criterion introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987) .
In our setting, intuitive criterion requires that, given an equilibrium contract strategy pair ( f , b * 2 ) and following a renegotiation offer (g , b 2 ), beliefs put positive probability only on types for which (g , b 2 ) is not equilibrium-dominated, i.e., only on those types θ ′ for which
This leads to the following definition.
is strongly renegotiation-proof if for all a 1 ∈ A 1 and θ ∈ Θ for which there exists an incentive compatible (g , b 2 ) such that
and
This is exactly the same as renegotiation-proofness except that it adds condition (14) , which allows us to construct beliefs that satisfy intuitive criterion after any renegotiation offer. It can be shown that when we work with this definition, Theorem 1 needs to be modified as follows. 
It is also easy to show Propositions 3 and 4 go through with a minor modification similar to the one made in Theorem 4.
Equilibrium Outcomes of Games with Contracts
There may be legal or technological constraints that might render contracts non-renegotiable and therefore outcomes that can be supported by non-renegotiable contracts are of interest on their own.
Furthermore, understanding non-renegotiable contracts will help place our results within the literature and allow us to isolate the effects of renegotiation. Similarly, and irrespective of whether a contract is renegotiable, there may be valid reasons why a contract maybe observable or unobservable.
Legal contracts between a firm and a bank, or a government and an international body, and many compensation contracts are observable yet subject to renegotiation if the parties find it in their benefit to do so. Other contracts can be either secret or subject to renegotiation before the game begins,
i.e., they can be unobservable. In this section we will present results regarding the outcomes that can be supported under different assumptions about the contracts.
Observable Contracts
Let us assume that the contract signed between player 2 and the third-party before the game begins is observable to player 1 but may or may not be renegotiated after player 1 moves in the game.
Non-renegotiable Contracts
If the contracts are observable but not renegotiable, then we can show that player 2 can obtain the best payoff possible given that player 2 plays an increasing strategy and player 1 best responds. More precisely, define the best Stackelberg payoff of player 2 asŪ
the worst Stackelberg payoff asŪ Proof. In Section 8.
The proof of this result is quite easy. In the definition of the best Stackelberg payoff, player 2 is playing the best increasing strategy, say b * 2 , given that player 1 is playing a best response that is most favorable for player 2. Proposition 2 implies that b * 2 is incentive compatible, i.e., there is a contract, say f * , that makes it optimal to play. It is easy to show that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with observable and non-renegotiable contracts in which player 2 offers f * with expected value δ, player 1 plays the most favorable best response to that, say b * 1 , and player 2 plays b * Proof. In Section 8.
In order to see why letb 2,a 1 argmin b 2 ∈B + 2 U (a 1 , b 2 ) for any a 1 ∈ A 1 . In other words, for any a 1 , b 2,a 1 is the worst increasing strategy for player 1 that player 2 can play. Sinceb 2,a 1 is increasing, it can be shown that there is a contract that makes it uniquely optimal to play. Now let b * 
Renegotiable Contracts
If the contracts are observable and renegotiable, then player 2 can again achieve his Stackelberg payoff, except that the definition of this payoff must reflect the fact that player 2 plays a renegotiationproof strategy. Define the best and worst renegotiation-proof Stackelberg payoffs of player 2 asŪ b 2 ) and the worst Stackelberg payoff asŪ
and note that the difference in the definitions comes from the fact that player 2 has to play a renegotiation-proof strategy. Proof. In Section 8.
The proof of this result also constructs an equilibrium in which player 2 receives the best Stackelberg payoff that he can get by playing a renegotiation-proof strategy. There is however a complication in the proof compared with the proof of Proposition 6. When contracts are non-renegotiable any deviation from the contract that induces the best Stackelberg outcome under increasing strategies must still induce an increasing strategy. This implies that no deviation can yield a higher payoff.
When contracts are renegotiable a deviation may or may not induce a renegotiation-proof strategy and hence we cannot tell whether such a deviation can yield a payoff that is strictly higher than the best Stackelberg payoff that can be obtained by a renegotiation-proof strategy. However, in the proof of Proposition 8 we construct an equilibrium in which any deviation obtained via renegotiation can also be obtained via a renegotiation-proof strategy, and this gives us the desired result.
We can again show that player 2 cannot get a payoff that is smaller than his worst Stackelberg payoff that can be obtained with renegotiation-proof strategies.
Proposition 9. If contracts are observable, thenŪ W R 2 − δ is the smallest payoff that can be supported with non-renegotiable contracts.
Proof. Proof of this result is similar to that of Proposition 7 and omitted.
The above results provide sharp predictions for equilibrium outcomes of the games with observable contracts. In particular, they show that third-party contracts play the role of a commitment device to the extent that player 2's strategy respects the constraints brought about by incentive compatibility, in the case of non-renegotiable contracts, and renegotiation-proofness, in the case of renegotiable contracts. The implications of these results in terms of the equilibrium outcomes depend on the specifics of the original game. We present some of these implications in our running example and further in Section 6.
EXAMPLE: ENTRY DETERRENCE
Assume that p = 2/3 so that player 1's best response correspondence is single-valued:
Remember that the set of incentive compatible strategies is B + 2 = {F F, F A, A A} and the set of renegotiation-proof strategies is B R 2 = {F A, A A}. Therefore, the Stackelberg payoff of player 2 given that he plays an incentive compatible strategy is m, which he achieves by playing F F . Proposition 6 and 7 imply that this is the unique payoff that can be supported with observable and non-renegotiable contracts. In other words, entry-deterrence is the unique equilibrium outcome. How about with RP contracts? If p > 2/3, then the Stackelberg payoff is m, obtained by playing F A, whereas if p < 2/3, F A does not deter entry and the best player 2 can do in this case is to play A A, with payoff p x + (1 − p)z.
In other words, if p > 2/3 unique equilibrium outcome is entry-deterrence and if p < 2/3 unique equilibrium outcome is entry and accommodate.
Unobservable Contracts
We now assume that the initial contract between player 2 and the third party is not observable to player 1. Again there are two possibilities: the contract could be renegotiable or non-renegotiable.
Non-Renegotiable Contracts
If contracts are non-renegotiable, we have the following characterization. 
Proof. In Section 8
This result shows that unobservable third-party contracts potentially enlarges the set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium. Furthermore, while earlier papers showed that, when there is no asymmetric information, any Nash equilibrium of the original game can be supported with unobservable contracts, this result shows that only the subset of Bayesian Nash equilibria in which the second player plays an increasing strategy can be supported if, instead, there is asymmetric information.
This result also has an immediate corollary in terms of the outcomes that can be supported. For b 2 (b 1 , θ) . Define the individually rational payoff of player 1 as
This is the best payoff player 1 can guarantee for herself in game G, given that player 2 plays an increasing strategy. 23 The following easily follows from Proposition 10. Again, note that, in general, outcomes that are not perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the original game can also be supported. This can be achieved by writing a contract that leads player 2 to punish player 1 when he deviates from his equilibrium action. Since contracts cannot be conditioned on θ and u 2 has increasing differences, player 2 can only use punishment strategies that are increasing in θ. The best that player 1 can do by deviating is therefore given by U 1 , and his equilibrium payoff cannot be smaller than this payoff. This is condition (2). Condition (1), on the other hand, simply follows from the requirement that only Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes can be supported, and hence, player 2 must be best responding along the equilibrium path.
Note that if θ were contractible as well, we would not need to limit the punishment strategies to be increasing. In this case, condition (2) would have the individually rational payoff defined as a 1 , b 2 ) . In that case, the result would be the exact analog of those in models without asymmetric information, i.e., Koçkesen and Ok (2004) and Koçkesen (2007) .
We should also note that there are interesting environments in which non-contractibility of θ does not restrict the set of outcomes that can be supported with non-renegotiable contracts. For example if player 1's payoff does not depend on θ, then the punishment does not have to depend on θ either. Therefore, one can simply use a constant punishment after each deviation, which would be increasing by construction. A second environment is games with monotone externalities, in which u 1 is increasing (or decreasing) in a 2 . In this case, after any a 1 , the harshest punishment is the lowest (or highest) a 2 , which is constant and hence increasing.
Renegotiable Contracts
Suppose now that the contracts are unobservable and renegotiable. The counterpart to Proposition 10 is the following: 
Proof. In Section 8
This result too has an immediate corollary. Define the best payoff player 1 can guarantee for herself in game G, given that player 2 plays a renegotiation-proof strategy as U
We have the following corollary. In order to apply the results on unobservable contracts the crucial piece of information is the individually rational payoff of player 1 given that player 2 plays an increasing or a renegotiation-proof strategy. We illustrate how this can be done in Section 6.1 for a large class of games that we call games with monotone externalities. We show that in those games the only thing that distinguishes the case of renegotiation-proof contracts from non-renegotiable contracts is that the highest type of player 2 must play a best response to any a 1 under renegotiation-proof contracts, whereas the only restriction is that he plays an increasing strategy in the case of non-renegotiable contracts.
EXAMPLE: ENTRY DETERRENCE
Individually rational payoffs of player 1 are given by
Corollary 1 implies that (O, F F ) and (E , A A) can both be supported with unobservable and nonrenegotiable contracts. Corollary 2 implies that if p > 2/3 both (O, F A) and (E , A A) can be supported with unobservable and RP contracts, whereas if p < 2/3 only (E , A A) can be supported.
Applications

Games with Monotone Externalities
We say that an original game G is a game with monotone externalities if player 1's payoff is monotonically increasing or decreasing in player 2's action, i.e., for any a 1 and θ, a a 1 , a 2 , θ) . 24 Such positive or negative externalities are very common in economic models. Indeed, the class of games that satisfy these conditions includes Stackelberg and entry games, sequential Bertrand games with differentiated products, monopolistic screening, and ultimatum bargaining, among others.
Assume that contracts are unobservable. Fix a 1 ∈ A 1 , let a 2 (a 2 ) be the smallest (largest) element of A 2 , and define
Note that this strategy is increasing in θ and it is the harshest punishment player 2 can inflict upon player 1, i.e., b
for all a 1 . In other words, the individually rational payoff of player 1 given that player 2 plays an increasing strategy is given by U
We can directly apply Corollary 1 and conclude that an outcome (a * 1 , a * 2 ) of the original game G with monotone externalities can be supported with non-renegotiable contracts if and only if a * 2 (θ) ∈ B R 2 (a * 1 , θ) for all θ and U 1 (a * 1 , a * 2 ) ≥ U + 1 . Which outcomes can be supported with unobservable and renegotiation-proof contracts? Proposition 3 implies that the harshest punishment strategy b + 2 is not renegotiation proof. 25 Using Proposition 4 we can show that, if u 1 is increasing in a 2 , the harshest renegotiation-proof punishment is to make the highest type of player 2 play a best response, while the other types play the smallest a 2 (see 24 Note that player 1's payoff may be increasing in a 2 for some a 1 and decreasing for others. 25 See Lemma 3 in Section 8, which shows that renegotiation-proofness of a strategy
implies that the highest (lowest, resp.) type does not have a profitable deviation to a higher (lower, resp.) action.
Lemma 2 in Section 8). Similarly, if u 1 is decreasing in a 2 , the harshest renegotiation-proof punishment is to make the smallest type best respond and the other types play the largest a 2 .
More precisely, let b n 2 (a 1 ) ∈ argmin a 2 ∈B R 2 (a 1 ,θ n ) u 1 (a 1 , a 2 , θ n ) and b
Define the punishment strategy as 
The best payoff that player 1 can achieve against this strategy is U
. We can then apply Corollary 2 to games with monotone externalities.
Corollary 3.
An outcome (a * 1 , a *
) of an original game with monotone externalities can be supported with unobservable and renegotiation-proof contracts if and only if (1) a
Therefore, the effect of renegotiation in this environment is very clear. If the contracts are unobservable and non-renegotiable, then any outcome (a 1 , a 2 ) in which player 2 best responds on the equilibrium path and punishes player 1 in the harshest possible way off-the-equilibrium can be supported. With unobservable and renegotiation-proof contracts player 2 cannot punish player 1 in the harshest possible way anymore: the highest (or the lowest) type must play a best response even offthe-equilibrium path.
We next apply these results to a game that has been a canonical example for issues related to commitment: Stackelberg and entry-deterrence games.
QUANTITY COMPETITION AND ENTRY-DETERRENCE
Consider a Stackelberg game in which firm 1 moves first by choosing an output level q 1 ∈ Q 1 and firm 2, after observing q 1 , chooses its own output level q 2 ∈ Q 2 . Inverse demand function is given by P (q 1 , q 2 ) = max{0, α − q 1 − q 2 }, where α > 0, and we assume Q i is a rich enough finite subset of R + whose largest element is α. 26 Cost function of firm 1 is C 1 (q 1 ) = c q 1 , where c is common knowledge, whereas the cost function of firm 2 is C 2 (q 2 ) = θq 2 . We assume that θ ∈ {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ n }, where n ≥ 2, is private information of firm 2 and θ 1 < θ 2 < · · · < θ n . Firm 1 believes that the probability of θ i is given by p(θ i ) and for ease of exposition we assume that expected value of θ is equal to c. The profit function of firm i is given by π i (q 1 , q 2 , θ) = P (q 1 , q 2 )q i − C i (q i ) and we assume that both firms are profit maximizers.
To ensure positive output levels in equilibrium we assume that α > 2θ n − c, in which case the (Stackelberg) equilibrium outcome of this game is given by
Define the game G as follows: Let A 1 = Q 1 and A 2 = {−q 2 : q 2 ∈ Q 2 } and define i on A i as a i i
Let the payoff function of player i be given by u i (a 1 , a 2 , θ) = 26 We introduce this assumption so that player 2 can choose a high enough output level to drive the price to zero.
The game G is strategically equivalent to the Stackelberg game defined in the previous paragraph. It is also easy to show that u 2 has strictly increasing differences in (a 2 , θ) and u 1 is increasing in a 2 .
Let us first assume that contracts are unobservable. Since u 2 has strictly increasing differences and u 1 is increasing in a 2 , we can apply Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 to characterize all the outcomes that can be supported with non-renegotiable as well as renegotiation-proof third-party contracts. In order to apply Corollary 1, we need to calculate the individually rational payoff of player 1, i.e., U + 1 as defined in equation (17) . The harshest punishment firm 2 can inflict is to drive the price down to zero by producing α for any type θ. Since this is a constant (and hence an increasing) strategy, it follows that U 1 = 0. In other words, any outcome (a * 1 , a * 2 (θ)) such that firm 2 best responds to a * 1 and firm 1 gets at least zero profit can be supported with non-renegotiable contracts. In particular, entry can be deterred with non-renegotiable contracts.
Can entry be deterred with renegotiation-proof contracts? In order to apply Corollary 2, we need to first calculate player 1's individually rational payoff given that player 2 plays a renegotiation-proof strategy. The discussion above implies that the harshest punishment is obtained when the highest type of player 2 best responds while the other types choose the lowest a 2 , i.e., a 2 = −α. Player 1's expected payoff when player 2 plays this strategy is given by
Its maximum,
i.e., player 1's individually rational payoff, is therefore equal to
Condition ( 
Corollary 4. Entry can be deterred with unobservable and non-renegotiable contracts. It can be deterred with unobservable and renegotiation-proof contracts if and only if p(θ
Now let us assume that contracts are observable. The best payoff that player 2 can obtain in the original game is the monopoly outcome, i.e., a * Could player 2 achieve the monopoly outcome with renegotiation-proof contracts? The above analysis implies that the answer is yes as long as U
It is easy to see that if this condition holds, then the unique equilibrium outcome that can be achieved with observable and renegotiation-proof contracts is the monopoly outcome. If, on the other hand, p(θ n )(α+ θ n )−2c > 0, then monopoly outcome can no longer be supported with renegotiation-proof contracts.
However, player 2 can obtain the following outcome: Player 1 plays a * 1 , where a * 1 is the smallest a 1 such that
and player 2 plays a *
for all θ. In this outcome, player 1 produces the smallest amount consistent with player 2 punishing with the harshest possible renegotiation-proof strategy off-theequilibrium and best responding on the equilibrium path.
Dewatripont (1988) has analyzed a similar entry game and showed that entry can be deterred with renegotiation-proof contracts under certain conditions. His conditions are different from ours because he uses a different renegotiation-proofness concept, namely durability, first introduced by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) . A decision rule is durable if and only if the parties involved would never unanimously approve a change from this decision rule to any other decision rule. Holmstrom and Myerson showed that this is equivalent to interim incentive efficiency when there is only one player with private information. In our context, only player 2 has private information and hence a contract-strategy pair ( f , b * 2 ) is interim incentive efficient (and therefore durable) if and only if there is no a 1 ∈ A 1 and an incentive compatible (g , b 2 ) such that after a 1 every type of player 2 and the third-party do better under (g , b 2 ), with at least one doing strictly better.
We have a characterization of durable strategies for the two-type case, i.e., when Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 }, and even in that case, the relationship between our concept of renegotiation-proofness and durability turns out to be quite subtle. It is not difficult to show that neither concept implies the other one in general. However, in games with monotone externalities it can be shown that durability implies renegotiation-proofness. The entry-deterrence game is a game with monotone externalities, and therefore, if entry can be deterred with durable contracts, it can also be deterred with renegotiation-proof contracts. In fact, in the entry-deterrence game player 2's payoff function is single-peaked and for such environments we have a complete characterization of durable outcomes that is particularly easy to apply. Using this characterization, we can show that the relationship between durability and renegotiation-proofness is strict.
Proposition 12. In the entry-deterrence game with two types, if p
1 (θ 2 + α) > (θ 2 − θ 1
), then entry can be deterred with renegotiation-proof contracts but not with durable contracts.
Proof. Available upon request.
Remember that the harshest renegotiation-proof punishment strategy of the incumbent is to flood the market if entry occurs, except for the highest type (type θ 2 ), who has to best respond. Durability still requires that the highest type best responds. The difference is that flooding the market for type θ 1 is not a durable strategy: There is a restriction on how much the incumbent can produce in response to entry, which is condition (d) of Proposition 1 in Dewatripont (1988).
Commitment to monetary policy
In this section we apply our results to the problem of credibility of monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Barro and Gordon (1983) ). Consider the following model. Public (player 1) forms expectations of inflation rate π e after which the economy receives a zero mean shock θ and the policy maker (player 2) sets the inflation rate π. Unemployment rate is given by an expectation augmented Phillips curve with a stochastic shock, U = U * − α(π − π e ) + θ, where α > 0 and U * is the natural rate of unemployment. The policy maker's objective function is −U 2 − βπ 2 whereas the public aims to accurately forecast the inflation rate.
We can study this model in our framework by defining the following game G. Let a 1 = π e , a 2 = π,
Let the payoff functions be 28 It is easy to show that u 2 has strictly increasing differences in (π, θ).
With an abuse of notation denote the public strategy as π e ∈ R and the policy maker's strategy as π(π e , θ). The literature looks at a particular class of equilibria known as rational expectations equilibria in which the public always predicts the inflation rate accurately: 
As it is well known this outcome is inefficient and the policy maker would rather commit to the policy π(θ) = 27 In our model we assumed that A 1 and A 2 are finite. In this application, we are assuming that they have the cardinality of the continuum. In order for the results of the paper to go through, we need to assume that player 2 is restricted to offer contracts f after which player 1 and 2's optimal continuation plays are well defined. 28 We assume that the third-party is neutral. If not, we can modify our results as suggested in Section 4.2. 29 See Lemma 4 for the reasons behind these restrictions.
Proposition 15. The unique outcome supported by observable and renegotiable third party contracts is
Proposition 15 tells us that if contracts can be renegotiated, the inflationary bias cannot be completed eliminated. However, the average inflation rate is less than the one produced by the discretionary monetary policy (i.e., the one without commitment). In other words, the possibility to renegotiate the contracts reduces the commitment role of contracts, but does not completely eliminate
it.
An interesting feature of the equilibrium outcome with renegotiable contracts is that the realized inflation differ from the non-renegotiable case only in the "worst state" of the world θ n . This implies that the average inflation rate is increasing in the probability p n . As p n approaches one, π e approaches α β U * (the inflation rate without commitment), while as p n approaches zero, the average inflation rate approaches zero (the inflation rate under full commitment).
Another observation is that in this model, unlike in the entry-deterrence model, unobservable contracts (whether they are renegotiable or not) are completely ineffectual in solving the problem of credibility of monetary policy. Indeed, if the contracts are unobservable, then the only outcome of the original game that can be supported is the equilibrium outcome of the original game given by the rational expectations equilibrium without commitment. 30 
Conclusion
In this paper we studied the extent to which renegotiation reduces the commitment value of thirdparty contracts in extensive form games with incomplete information. In order to isolate the effect of renegotiation, we compared the outcomes that can be supported with non-renegotiable contracts with those that can be supported with renegotiable contracts, and showed that when renegotiation cannot be excluded the committing party is restricted to choose renegotiation-proof strategies. More precisely we showed that when the contracts are observable to the first mover, then the second mover obtains her Stackelberg payoff that can be achieved with renegotiation-proof strategies. When the contracts are not observable, then some kind of a "folk theorem" is true: Any outcome in which the second mover best responds to the first mover's action and the first mover obtains his individually rational payoff can be supported. In the definition of the individually rational payoff, player 2 is restricted to using increasing and renegotiation-proof strategies.
The restriction imposed by renegotiation-proofness is particularly transparent in some interesting economic applications. In particular, we apply our results to games with monotone externalities, i.e., games in which the first mover's payoff is monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the second mover's action, and to a model of credibility of monetary policy (which is not a game with monotone externalities). The general message is that, while renegotiation does limit the commitment value of third-party contracts and hence, in general, has bite, renegotiable contracts still have an important strategic value. In games with monotone externalities, player 2 can induce player 1 to play player 2's favorite action by punishing him if he plays some other action. If player 1's payoff is increasing in player 2's action, then the worst punishment is to play the lowest possible action for every type of player 2. However, this is not a renegotiation-proof strategy. The worst renegotiation-proof punishment is to best respond for the highest type while the others play the smallest action. 30 This follows immediately from Propositions 10 and 11 and the restriction in our strategy space.
In the problem of credibility of monetary policy, it is well-known that with non-renegotiable contracts it is possible to eliminate the inflationary bias and to achieve the socially optimal policy. We show that if contracts are renegotiable, the rate of inflation in the worst state of the world (e.g., a financial crisis) must be the discretionary one, while the rate of inflation in all the other states of the world are the same as the rate of inflation chosen in the case of non-renegotiable contracts.
The class of games considered in this paper is quite large and we believe that there are many other interesting models or economic problems that can benefit from the analysis and the methods developed in this paper.
Proofs
In the game with non-renegotiable contracts, player 2 has an information set at the beginning of the game, which we identify with the null history , and an information set for each ( f , θ, a 1 ) ∈ C ×Θ× A 1 ,
Player 3 has an information set for each f ∈ C . If contracts are unobservable, then player 1 has only one information set, given by C . If contracts are observable, then player 1 has an information set for each f ∈ C . In the game with renegotiable contracts, player 2 has additional information sets corresponding to each history ( f , θ, a 1 , g , y) and ( f , θ, a 1 , g , n) and player 3 has an additional information set of each ( f , a 1 , g ), which we denote by , denote with b f * (a 1 , θ) the strategy that
Consider the following assessment, denoted (β ′ , µ ′ ), in which player 2 offers h * and plays according to b h * without attempting to renegotiate. Player 1 has the same beliefs as in (β, µ), β
and β 2 ). Since 
which holds by optimality of b f * (a 1 , θ). If a 2 is such that there exist θ θ) ), implying that player 2 has a profitable deviation after ( f * , θ, a 1 ) and contradicting that (β, µ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 32 Finally, if there is no θ ′ ∈ Θ, with a 2 = b h * (a 1 , θ ′ ), then (21) holds trivially. (21) holds, because, otherwise after (a 1 , θ) player 2 could choose a 2 = b f * (a 1 , θ ′ ) (without renegotiating f * ) and could get a payoff of a 1 ) (a 1 , θ) ).
This implies that player 2 has a profitable deviation after history ( f , θ, a 1 ), contradicting that (β, µ) is a PBE. If a 2 is such that there exists a θ
because, otherwise player 2 could offer g (θ ′ ,a 1 ) after (a 1 , θ) and once accepted play a 2 = b g (θ ′ ,a 1 ) (a 1 , θ ′ ).
This yields
and shows that player 2 has a profitable deviation after history ( f , θ, a 1 ), contradicting that (β, µ) is a 31 Note that g (θ,a 1 ) (a 1 , a 2 ) is accepted after a 1 in (β,µ) since θ ∈ Θ R a 1 by hypothesis. 32 
For player 3, β 3 (h * ) = y is optimal because β 3 ( f * ) = y is optimal and h * and f * induce the same continuation play; β , a 1 , g , x) , for x = y, n. For player 2, β θ, a 1 , g , x) = β 2 ( f , θ, a 1 , g , x) , for x = y, n, is optimal by construction. Similarly, for any f = h * , β The proof for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (β, µ) of the game Γ RU (G) is virtually identical and omitted.
We first introduce some notation. Let the number of elements in Θ be equal to n and order its elements so that θ Similarly for ≤, <, and ≪. 
2 is increasing by construction, there exists a contract f * such 33 Again note that g (θ ′ ,a 1 ) is accepted under (β,µ) by construction.
If player 2 offers any contract f = f * , the continuation play will be (
it will be rejected and hence it cannot be a profitable deviation. If
by construction. Therefore, it is optimal for player 2 to offer f * . Sequential rationality at other information sets are easily checked and we conclude that this assessment is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with observable contracts. 
. . , n − 1, and A ′ y = 0 imply y ≤ 0. 34 If there exist i such thatb 2,a 1 (a 1 ,θ i ) =b 2,a 1 (a 1 ,θ i−1 ) simply eliminate the incentive compatibility constraint between them and setf a 1 (a 1 ,b 2,a 1 (a 1 ,θ i )) =f a 1 (a 1 ,b 2,a 1 (a 1 ,θ i−1 )). 35 To see this let x = ζ f a 1 Let ε > 0 be small and define f (b * 1 , a 2 ) = δ + ε for all a 2 . For any
Under this contract, player 2 plays a best response to a * 1 and according tob 2,a 1 after any a 1 = a * 1 . Player 1, on the other hand, must play a best response to b * 2 . This is because for any a 1 ∉ B R 1 (b * 1 ), we have U 1 (br 1 a 1 ,b 2,a 1 ) . Therefore, deviation to such a contract yields a payoff of U 2 (b * 1 , b * 2 )−δ−ε >Ũ 2 , for small enough ε. In other words, player 2 has a profitable deviation, contradicting thatŨ 2 is an equilibrium payoff.
Before we proceed to the proof of Proposition 8 we need to introduce a definition and prove a supplementary lemma.
Definition 10.
We say that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (β, µ) of the game with renegotiable contracts has conservative beliefs if a 1 , θ) ).
In other words, whenever, in equilibrium, type θ renegotiates the contract from f to g , the thirdparty should not expect a decrease in the transfer from that type. This lemma tell us that in any equilibrium with conservative beliefs, one can achieve any outcome that is achieved via renegotiation after a 1 by using a renegotiation-proof contract.
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix a a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with conservative beliefs and suppose that contract f is renegotiated after some a 1 and θ. Let the set of types after which f is renegotiated be
For any θ ∈ Θ R , let g θ be the new contract and b g θ (a 1 , θ) be the new strategy of player 2 after a 1 and θ. Also let b f (a 1 , θ) be the equilibrium strategy of player 2 after a 1 and θ if he does not renegotiate f . In other words, we have
For ease of exposition we will omit the reference to a 1 in the following. Consider the following mixture menu:
It is clear that this menu replicates the outcome induced by f after a 1 . We also claim that this menu is incentive compatible and renegotiation proof after a 1 .
Incentive compatibility of ( f , b f ) implies that no two types in Θ N R has an incentive to mimic each other. Consider θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ R and suppose, for contradiction, that
But then type θ could increase her payoff after ( f , a 1 ) by offering g θ ′ and playing b g θ ′ (θ ′ ) rather than offering g θ and playing b g θ (θ). 36 Now let θ ′ ∈ Θ N R and θ ∈ Θ R , and suppose for contradiction that
This implies that after ( f , a 1 ) offering g θ , which is accepted in equilibrium, and playing b g θ (θ) is a profitable deviation for type θ ′ .
Finally, let θ ′ ∈ Θ N R and θ ∈ Θ R and suppose, for contradiction, that
But then type θ could play b f (θ ′ ) after ( f , a 1 ) and receive a higher payoff rather than offering g θ , which
is accepted, and playing b g θ (θ). This proves that the mixture menu is incentive compatible.
Suppose now, for contradiction, that the mixture menu is not renegotiation-proof after a 1 . Then, there exists θ and an incentive compatible contract strategy pair (h, b h ) such that if θ ∈ Θ N R , then,
if θ ∈ Θ R , then
Since gθ is accepted for allθ ∈ Θ R and the equilibrium has conservative beliefs,
which, together with (24) and (25) , implies that
Suppose first that θ ∈ Θ N R . Inequalities (22) and (27) imply that after ( f , a 1 ) type θ could offer h, which would be accepted, and increase her payoff, a contradiction that in equilibrium she plays b f (θ) after
Similarly, if θ ∈ Θ R , then (23) and (27) imply that after ( f , a 1 ) type θ could offer h, which would 36 Note that g θ ′ is accepted after ( f , a 1 ) in equilibrium by assumption.
be accepted, and increase her payoff, rather than offering g θ , a contradiction. Therefore, the mixture menu is renegotiation-proof.
Since the mixture is incentive compatible we can easily extend it to a contract whose domain is the entire A 2 rather than just the range of b f and b g θ . Define the new contract as
and note that h is well-defined since incentive compatibility of the mixture menu implies that when- b 2, f (a 1 , θ) ) for all θ ∈ Θ, the equilibrium constructed above has conservative beliefs. Lemma 
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G is a direct consequence of sequential rationality of players 1 and 2. It must also be the case that it is optimal to play according to b 
for any (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 , and 2 ) = δ. Furthermore, using Theorem 1, it can be easily checked that ( f * , b * 2 ) is incentive compatible and renegotiation-proof. For any f ∈ C , a 1 , and θ, let b 2, f (a 1 , θ) ∈ argmax a 2 u 2 (a 1 , a 2 , θ)− f (a 1 , a 2 ) and g ( f ,θ,a 1 ) ∈ argmax g u 2 (a 1 , b 2,g (a 1 , θ), θ) − g (a 1 , b 2,g (a 1 , θ) ) subject to g (a 1 , b 2,g (a 1 , θ ′ )) ≥ The first order condition of the maximization problem for player 1 is 
which has the solutionπ
In order to obtain the solution to the original problem we substitute (34) and (35) 
The system of equations (42) 
